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Based on cross-time-section series data collected from Wall Street
Journal (WSJ), this article suggests that the Corruption
Perceptions Index (CPI) for 60 countries/regions published by
Transparency International is highly correlated with WSJ news
about “corruption”, especially for eight strong countries.
Compared to a slight converging trend of CPI standard deviation,
the CPI score presents no significant response to time. Our partial
multiple correlation model suggests that WSJ news may be a good
indicator of corruption levels in a country, although not as a poten-
tial cause influencing CPI. 
Introduction
Corruption is an important issue in business, economic, and social sci-
ence research. Due to differences in research focus and perspective, previous
literature has provided varying definitions for corruption. Some studies exam-
ine the corrupt behavior of politicians (LaPalombara, 1995; Oldenbury, 1987),
while others describe corruption between private parties, such as in commercial
bribery (Coase, 1979).  Shleifer and Vishny define corruption as “the use of
governmental power to create rents via entry controls, regulatory cartel
enforcement, or raising rivals’ costs” (Shleifer & Vishny, 1993: 599). In
Macrae’s definition, corruption is “the arrangement that involves an exchange
between two parties which (1) has an influence on the allocation of resources
either immediately or in the future; and (2) involves the use or abuse of public
or collective responsibility for private ends” (Macrae, 1982: 678). 
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Since Transparency International (TI) began to publish its annual report
of Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) in 1995, this index has become a lead-
ing indicator of corruption in social science research, and has been widely used
for measuring the level of corruption across countries. The definition given by
TI focuses on the public sector, and is defined as “the misuse of public power
for private benefit such as bribing of public officials, kickbacks on public pro-
curement, or embezzlement of public funds” (Transparency International,
2003). The CPI score reflects the impressions and perceptions of corruption in
dozens of countries based on surveys of business people, academics, risk ana-
lysts, and the general public, and ranges from “0 = highly corrupt” to “10 =
highly clean”. As we are interested in the explanation and justification of per-
ceived levels of corruption, TI’s definition will be used for the current study.
The other important publication used in our study is the Wall Street
Journal (WSJ), the flagship publication of the Dow Jones. In addition to the
U.S. edition, which is edited in New York, the company publishes the Asian
Wall Street Journal, edited in Hong Kong, and the Wall Street Journal Europe,
edited in Brussels. WSJ and its global editions are some of the most respected
sources of worldwide business and financial news.  We noticed that the annual
number of WSJ reports concerning corruption for a particular country appeared
to correlate with the CPI score of that country. For example, despite its econo-
my status, Italy suffers from high levels of corruption. Furthermore, its per-
ceived level of corruption has varied greatly over the past nine years, with CPI
values ranging from 2.99 (1995) to 5.5 (2001). After plotting annual amounts
of corruption news with the annual CPI score, we found that the changing trend
of WSJ news reflects variance of the CPI score1, as Figure 1 shows. This find-
ing led us to examine the relationship between news coverage and corruption.
Figure 1. Relationship between CPI score and Corruption news in Italy
between 1995-2003.
We have three empirical predications.  It must be stated from the outset
that we are not concerned with causality issues here, but simply an association
between WSJ news and CPI scores.
Hypothesis 1: The CPI of a country is negatively associated with WSJ news
items concerning “corruption”.
We adopted absolute CPI scores to reflect a country’s level of corruption.
This is because a country’s ranking order can vary annually.  Thus, TI recom-
mends that absolute scores be used in year to year comparisons rather than rel-
ative ranks. Two factors can account for year to year changes in CPI score: the
changing perception of a country’s actual performance, and changes in sam-
pling and methodology. Therefore, we predict a time effect, where CPI scores
will show shifting trends from year to year. 
Hypothesis 2: The CPI score is sensitive to the year that has been surveyed.
CPI is a composite index. For example, the 2003 CPI report consisted of
survey years between 2001 to 2003 (information for each country was drawn
on 17 different polls/surveys from 13 independent institutions, including the
World Economic Forum (WEF), Institute of Management Development (IMD),
World Bank (WB), and Gallup International (GI)). 
Hypothesis 3: Countries display different sensitivity with respect to the rela-
tionship between CPI score and WSJ news.
In addition to the time difference, the sampling countries in these sources
also vary greatly.  For example, the Risk Ratings Survey conducted by World
Markets Research Center (WMRC) covers 186 countries, while the Asian
Intelligence Issue conducted by Political & Economic Risk Consulting (PERC)
covers only 14 countries. During the combination process, the minimal
required number of surveys is three before one country can be included in the
final CPI report. Thus, in the 2003 report, the number of surveys used to gen-
erate country scores varied from 3 to 17. Such a large variance affects the reli-
ability of the CPI score for each country.  In general, a strong country will enjoy
a large number of data sources, and thus convey high reliability as to the per-
ceived score. This fact may affect the significance of correlations between WSJ
news and CPI score. 
Methods
We developed a dataset from WSJ (including its global editions) describ-
ing news items concerning corruption for 60 countries/regions from 1995 to
2003. The data is from searched editions using the exact matching method (i.e.
the “citation or text” of news contained the word “corruption” for a given coun-
try in a given year). While we also searched the database using associated
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words such as “bribery”, the results showed that news items with these words
are far less numerous than for “corruption”. Additionally, search results for the
former overlapped in records. Thus, we have limited the dataset in our study to
items found by the word “corruption”.
We denote news items about corruption as nit for country i (i = 1...60) in
year t (t = 1...9, refers to year 1995-2003 respectively). The CPI score for that
year is cit.
We searched and calculated the total items of news items covering all top-
ics (besides corruption) for each country over the past nine years, which is as
ri. Therefore, the frequency of news (fi) for country i can be calculated as:
nfi = x 100% ,
ri
∑ ri
i=1
Here, n = 60, means the 60 countries/regions in our study.
Countries differ greatly in the frequency of news in WSJ2. From Table 1
the U.S. has the highest coverage, and was involved in 35.04% of all the items.
Eighty percent of all the countries are below the average level of coverage
(1.667%). 
In most of cases, corruption news in a strong country will have a high
probability of being reported, even if its degree of seriousness is similar or less
than that of other countries. However, once reported by WSJ, one additional
piece of corruption news in a less strong country will cause much deeper
impression toward the minds of its readers. Hence, we take the following for-
mula to estimate the real corruption events by the reported news in WSJ.
ñit reflects the amount of news events that are newsworthy to the same
degree across all countries. The estimated amount provides a reasonable base
to predict the perceptual index for each country, and to compare the level of
corruption across all countries.
Since changes in corruption for a country usually evolve slowly, while
public perception may change more quickly and is influenced by short-term
events, TI has based the CPI on a three-year rolling average. Thus, the 2003
CPI is based on the survey data provided between 2001 and 2003. However,
once a serious corruption event happens, WSJ can report it very quickly. Thus,
we assume a time lag for correlations between ñit and cit . To catch such a time
lag we have conducted further model competition analysis using seven differ-
ent time lagging or rolling methods.
ñit = 1n (1 +       )
nit
fi
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Using the 2003 CPI data as an example, Figure 2 shows that the correla-
tion between WSJ news and CPI score changes very gradually under different
time lag situations. Comparatively speaking, the three-year rolling data of news
has the strongest correlation coefficient to the 2003 CPI value. In reality, 2003
CPI report was released on October 7 2003, and its 17 survey sources were car-
ried out between 2001 to 2003. Therefore, this fact has explained the result of
our model competition. 
Here, k means the starting year of the three-year rolling method, and
ranged from 1993 to 2001. 
One concern of this study was whether the CPI score changed signifi-
cantly over time. Based on a period of nine years (1995~2003), we define eight
dummy variables (denoted as Y96, Y97, Y98, Y99, Y00, Y01, Y02 and Y03) to
capture changes that took place over the period of the study.
Figure 2. Time lag between CPI (2003) and WSJ News.
Method 1: Using the news data of 2003 (Without time lag)
Method 2: Using the news data of 2002 (One year’s time lag)
Method 3: Using the news data of 2001 (Two years’ time lag)
Method 4: Using the news data of 2000 (Three years’ time lag)
Method 5: Using the averaged data of 2003 and 2002 (Two years’ rolling)
Method 6: Using the averaged data of 2003, 2002 and 2001 (Three years’ rolling)
Method 7: Using the averaged data of 2003, 2002, 2001 and 2000 (Four years’ rolling)
As panel one in Table 1 shows, we calculated the three-year rolling data
of news for 60 countries/regions according to the following formula:
t
ñ it =∑nik
k=t-2
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Panel Two. Results of Multivariable Regression
Dependent Variables
Model 1:  CPI Score Model 2:  CPI SD*
Independent Variables: Estimate T-value Estimate T-value
News -1.409*** -12.290 0.067 1.590
Y96 0.131 0.290 0.678*** 4.020
Y97 -0.340 -0.790 0.861*** 5.450
Y98 0.056 0.130 0.238 1.500
Y99 0.045 0.110 0.177 1.150
Y00 0.094 0.230 0.147 0.960
Y01 0.121 0.290 0.138 0.890
Y02 -0.003 -0.010 -0.007 -0.050
Y03 0.051 0.120 -0.057 -0.370
Constant: 7.519*** 22.140 0.648*** 5.170
Model Parameter:
R2 0.238 0.109
F-value 17.050 6.640
Number of Observations: 501 501
Notes:
* Here, CPI SD refers to the difference in the value of the source. The greater CPI SD,
the greater the difference of perceptions of a country among the sources.
The score and standard deviation of the CPI is specified as:
CPI(S,SD) = ß0 + ß1 (NEWS) + ß2 (Y96) + ß3 (Y97) + ß4 (Y98) + ß5 (Y99)
+ ß6 (Y00) + ß7 (Y01) + ß8 (Y02) + ß9 (Y03) +  i
Here, CPI (S, SD) refers to two dependent variables (Score and Standard
Deviation of CPI), NEWS is the cross-section-time variable based on the three-
year rolling data (ñ it), Y96~Y03 refer to the time dummy variable indicating
the change for year 1996~2003 respectively from the baseline (1995), ß1 is the
regression coefficient to be estimated, and E i refers to the error terms.
While Table 1 only shows the 2003 CPI score, data from other years can
be obtained from the TI website (www.transparency.org). 
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Panel Three. Results of Regression for Four Groups
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4
Independent Variables: 3.156*** -1.367*** -1.199*** -1.271***
News (0.230) -(0.264) -(0.227) -(0.180)
Constant 10.359*** 7.681*** 7.304*** 6.716***
(0.312) (0.510) (0.353) (0.328)
Number of Observations 71 115 179 136
Number of Countries 8 13 21 18
R2 0.732 0.192 0.136 0.271
Adjusted R2 0.728 0.185 0.131 0.265
* = Significant at 10 percent; ** = Significant at 5 percent; *** = Significant at 1 per-
cent.
The dependent variable is the CPI score, and the independent variable is the WSJ news
about corruption. Entries are regression coefficients without standardization, and stan-
dard errors are in parentheses.
Results
Hypothesis 1 is supported. Panel two in Table 1 shows that there is a
strong relationship between the CPI score and the news reported by WSJ, with
an R2 ~ 23.4% overall. A negative coefficient (-1.401) refers to countries with
heavy corruption (indicated by smaller CPI values) that are more frequently
reported by WSJ.
Hypothesis 2 is rejected. There is no time-oriented change in the per-
ceived corruption score, and insufficient evidence to suggest that methodolog-
ical changes would mislead yearly comparisons. However, Table 1 shows a
slightly converging trend of annual published standard deviation of the CPI
score from each respondent. Year-to-year learning behavior and the cognitive
schema (Fiske & Taylor, 1991) may account for this trend over the past nine
years.
To test hypothesis 3, we clustered the 60 countries/regions into four
groups using the Euclidian distance based on the variable Frequency of news.
Due to its large distance from other countries, the U.S. was classified as one
single group.  The other 59 countries were classified into four other groups
using the k-mean method. Many reasons beside economic influence may
account for the extremely high value of Frequency of news2 for the U.S.
Therefore, we subsequently combined the U.S. into the nearest group (Group
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1) to make correlation analysis more reasonable in its sample size.  The four-
group partition reflects well the influential position of each country. Group 1
contains eight strong countries (U.S., Japan, China, United Kingdom, Germany,
Canada, France, and Russia), all of which have a powerful impact on global
business. Group 2 has less influence and power than Group 1, and contains the
13 countries. Countries in Group 3 (21 countries) and Group 4 (18 countries)
make up the remainder of those in our study.
As panel three in Table 1 shows, different groups report different sensi-
tivity for CPI value with respect to WSJ news. The correlation coefficient for
Group 1 is extremely high (R2=0.732). Although also significant, Group 3 is
much lower (R2=0.136). Therefore, hypothesis 3 is supported.
Discussion
Ballantine Illustration
Previous literature shows that cultural value is one important latent vari-
able in determining differences in corruption for countries. For example,
Husted’s comparative study (1999) of 44 countries has shown that corruption is
significantly correlated to three cultural dimensions. Getz and Volkema con-
firmed the positive relation between power distance and corruption level (Getz
& Volkema, 2001), and Houston and Graham (2001) suggest that relationship-
oriented countries (higher power distance and lower individualism) tend to be
more corrupted. Hence, we introduce cultural as another independent variable
influencing corruption. The improved multivariable regression model of CPI
score is as follows (due to their insignificant effect, the time dummy variables
are omitted):
CPI = ß0 + ß1 (NEWS) + ß2 (CULTURE) +  i
Our data agrees with the previously mentioned studies. As Table 2 shows,
exceedingly high correlation exists between three cultural dimensions (power
distance, uncertainty avoidance, and individualism) and the nine-year averaged
CPI score (Model 1, simple regression model with CULTURE as the single
independent variable). Two other regression models were also conducted:
regression of the nine-year averaged news data on the nine-year averaged CPI
score (Model 2, simple regression model with NEWS as the single independent
variable), and the regression of cultural values and WSJ news on the nine-year
averaged CPI score (Model 3, multiple regression model with NEWS and
CULTURE as the independent variables). Both these models have shown sig-
nificant correlations. 
We adopted partial correlation analysis to examine exact causality among
these three variables: CPI (denoted as Y), NEWS (denoted as X1) and CUL-
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Figure 3. Ballantine illustration
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TURE (denoted as X2). The Ballantine method suggested by Cohen (1983)
provides a good visual illustration of this causality (Figure 3). 
According to above, we have:
Correlation coefficient in Model 1: r2Y2 = b + c = 0.632
Correlation coefficient in Model 2: r2Y1 = a + c = 0.315
Correlation coefficient in Model 3: R2Y•12 = a + b + c = 0.650
Thus, the four parameters reflecting different parts of variance in Figure
3 can be calculated as:
a = 0.018
b = 0.335
c = 0.297
e = 1– (a+b+c) = 0.297
When X2 (CULTURE) is partial from both Y (CPI) and X1 (NEWS), the
correlation coefficient is: 
R 2 Y•12 – r2Y2 a
pr12 = r 2 Y1•2 = = = 0.0491 – r 2 Y2 a + e
R 2 Y•12 – r2Y1 b
pr22 = r 2 Y2•1 = = = 0.4891 – r 2 Y1 b + e
When X1 (NEWS) is partial from both Y (CPI) and X2 (CULTURE), the
correlation coefficient is:
According to the above result, cultural impact upon corruption still
remains after removing the effect of WSJ news. Conversely, WSJ news can
hardly contribute any further reduction of variance after removing the propor-
tion associated with cultural value. This suggests that WSJ news cannot be
regarded as one exogenous variable, and its effect has been mostly explained
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by cultural values. Thus, the assumed causality between WSJ news and CPI
score has disappeared in this situation, which implies that we cannot say that
WSJ news will affect the perception of corruption. 
Pavarala has summarized the causes of corruption found in the literature
as “administrative/bureaucratic, political, economic, and cultural”(Pavarala,
1996: 81). According to statistical principles, a more complex model with more
independent variables will not reject our above finding, a fact that we found
after conducting further analysis.
Validity of Finding
There are other indicators of corruption beside the TI CPI. Kaufmann,
Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton (2001) have developed a Graft Corruption Index
that includes scores for 155 countries. Despite some substantial differences in
data collection method, their dataset is almost identical to that of CPI, correlat-
ed at 0.98 (Knack and Azfar, 2001). In the annual Global Competitiveness
Report (GCR), two other indicators of corruption (Irregular payments and
Burden of corruption) are also included, and both are scaled from 1 to 7, with
smaller scores implying higher levels of corruption (Schwab, Porter, Sachs &
World Economic Forum, 1999; 2000; 2002). The World Business Environment
Survey (WBES) is a World Bank Group initiative that assesses the enabling
environment for private enterprise in a large number of countries. This survey
has an important indicator of corruption called General corruption constraint.
Table 3 presents the statistics of these frequently cited indicators of cor-
ruption, and their correlations to the WSJ news. All the correlations are strong
(i.e. all p-values are less than 1%). As in the CPI case, the cross-section-time
correlation for the eight strong countries is still extremely high (R = -0.910, p-
value < 0.0001). The rejection of the causal assumption between CPI score and
WSJ news does not reduce the value of the current study. Instead, we believe
that WSJ news can be regarded as another indicator of corruption for each
country. 
Conclusion
The current study examined the relationship between corruption news in
the WSJ and the CPI. Based on our dataset of news for 80 countries, the cross-
section-time regression analysis suggests a strong correlation between these
two variables. Time does not matter to the CPI score across the past nine years,
with only a slight converging trend of the dispersion of CPI value given by the
different respondents. After clustering the 80 countries into four groups accord-
ing to their appearing frequency in WSJ, we found out that correlation in the
four groups varies greatly. Group 1 includes eight strong countries (United
States, Japan, China, United Kingdom, Germany, Canada, France, and Russia)
and shows extremely high correlation. 
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The practical application of our findings is important. WSJ news con-
cerning corruption can be viewed as a one valuable data source to add to the
corruption index, especially for the eight strong countries. Additionally, when
compared to costly worldwide surveys, this indicator has the advantage of
being low-cost and high-convenience. 
From a theory-development standpoint, our study enhances understand-
ing of the perceived corruption index because WSJ news can be regarded as the
filtered result of corruption information after the perception of worldwide jour-
nalists and editors. Interestingly, irrespective of the different background of
respondents, their taste seems to correlate soundly. This finding shows the
robustness of perceptual figures, and contributes to understanding of real levels
of corruption.  Another implication of this study to theory is its illustration for
exploring causality. The strong association between WSJ news and CPI score
may lead to incorrect assumptions, but after introducing culture into our model,
the partial correlation convinced us that there is no causal relation between
these two variables. The Ballantine Illustration has provided a further and clear
explanation about causality in general.
As always, one must exercise caution when generalizing from one study.
An important limitation of our study was potential error in the data collection
process. In searching for news items for each country, we simply used items
with an exact match for the word “corruption”, even though this may have
caused some miscounts (for example, some positive reports about anti-corrup-
tion actions may have been mistaken as negative). However, we expect that the
uniform collection method across all the countries may reduce this bias to an
acceptable range. Another limitation of this study was its small dataset.
Although the cross-time-section collection method considerably expanded our
sample size, the number of observations for each country is relatively small,
which made some more rigid methods of analysis impossible. 
Endnotes
1. In order to expand the sample size from nine observations we used cross-time-section
data in our actual analysis. The Italian case in the Introduction is only a preliminary
example.
2. The U.S. WSJ is different from other editions, and as the case of Mexico shows, factors
such as geographical distance influences news reports here.
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